Daniel Dennett wrote that good intentions do not work in situations where expectations are higher, such as the expectations that we have for our doctors and engineers. Think about it, he offers, if doctors claimed to have acted on good intentions instead of sound medical understanding based on the most modern scientific explanations of biology and chemistry they would be sued for malpractice, and looked upon by all of us as quacks if not simply criminals. If bridges are built from faith rather than physical fact, then there are huge consequences. Many religious people claim faith is as important as fact. In fact, the often claim that it is more important than fact. But the fact is, there is not as much riding on faith. They also claim that bad things done in the name of religion have been done with the best of intentions (a recent conversation of mine with a friend concerning the Scopes trial exemplifies this point of view), and that it is the intentions that are most important in such cases. The argument is confusing because it does not make sense. While I may have good intentions, I cannot rely solely upon them to prove the validity of any argument. Good intentions, as good as they may be, cannot bear the weight of truth. “Good intention” is nothing more than the blind faith of someone who feels good about relying upon emotion rather than evidence.
People who believe in a God do so, not because their intentions are good, but because they have come to some conclusion by some means, or they simply accept what they have been told. If someone comes to a conclusion, then it is fair to assume that they have concluded based on some premise or set of premises, such as the cosmological or teleological arguments. When these arguments were first posited, they relied upon the strength of their premises to prove the plausibility of their conclusions. Over time, as science broadened its abilities and scope, these arguments became less valid until today; they are simply invalidated by the alternative conclusions that science offers. At this point, anyone who relies upon arguments such as the cosmological (intelligent design) or the teleological (the virtuous argument) to prove their conclusion must adhere to logic and admit defeat, or rely upon wishful thinking or blind faith. Good intentions do not change the truth of any argument, and so those with “good intentions” such persons must rely upon wishful thinking or blind faith.
This is not a case of positing a false dilemma. While it is true that all science starts from hypotheses (unproven propositions), good science takes any arguments and tests them for validity. Such science excludes the possibility of relying upon wishful thinking or blind faith. Even if a scientist has the best intentions, if the hypothesis fails, the scientist acting on good conscience (and upon truth) must admit that the proposition posited is untrue, no matter what the intentions of positing the proposition was in the first place. This leaves one of two possibilities for those that claim that good intentions are just as qualified as rational conclusions. First, that they are ignorant of a mistake and that their intentions were not deceptive in any way. The second possibility is less good: that they were aware of their ignorance but intentionally disregarded it hoping for the best (wishful thinking), or simply disregarded the truth and knowingly accepted false conclusions regardless of valid arguments against their proposition (blind faith). Good intentions do not change the nature of stupidity anymore than they change facts and expectations.
If one accepts religious propositions on good intentions, then they still have the responsibility of qualifying their reasoning on some other ground. Faith, based on good intention is one thing, but claiming that one’s propositions are true becausetheir intentions are good is another thing altogether. If I have faith, not because I fear death, and not because I take Pascal’s wager concluding that while there might not be a god and a hell I am safer betting that there is and being wrong, but because I truly believe that a god exists I can perhaps say that my belief is at the very least based on good intentions. But, I think that it is clear that my good intentions do not guarantee the truth of my belief: this is the rub. Those with good intentions in regard to religious belief, faith, cannot rely on those good intentions to guarantee any truth. In fact good intentions are not much different than faith. Because of this, good intentions cannot bear the weight of truthful propositions or valid argumentation, nor can they be the basis of disregarding the responsibility that we all have of separating faith from fact. Good intentions are simply not enough because they are unable to be qualified or exemplified in any way.
The idea of “good intentions” is two-fold. First, the term “good” is a qualifying statement: that is, “good” means that is acceptable socially or individually, and is justifiable in some valid way. Or, maybe it is deemed to be virtuous, that is: “good” is equated with honesty. Further, maybe it is believed that the consequences will be favorable. On the other hand, the term “intentions” has to do with motivation. The complex term “good intentions” therefore has multiple meanings, most of the time remaining vague to anyone outside of the individual having them. It can be argued that my intent to rid society of religious belief is a bad thing, but if my intentions are to rid society of a false, detrimental, and dangerous thing, then it would seem to be not so bad. If I do so using deceptive means, my intentions were good but my intentional deception can be deemed as bad. If my proposition is based on a personal vendetta against religion, one that is not credible, then my intentions are bad as well. All of this is simply to point out that “good intentions” are typically ambiguous and are at best limited to the individual: again, just as faith is.
The good intentions, therefore, of religious peoples are limited to their own beliefs, and are not qualified in any way to others or society as a whole, but only to their own lives. If a doctor operates with the intent to kill the patient, his intentions can be deemed as bad: the patient presumably trusts the doctor to cure rather than kill, and so there is a breach of contract between doctor and patient. If the doctor decides not to operate because of his personal belief that God will cure the patient, then he is acting irresponsibly for the same reason. Good intentions are often nothing more than a bad decision made worse by an even worse excuse.